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‘What is it?’ This question is asked in different ways, with a view 
to different varieties of answers. Philosophers, especially within the 
Western tradition, have taken different varieties of knowledge to be 
associated with different ways of answering this question. One kind of 
‘what is it?’ question had pride of place among ancient Greek 
philosophers: that which seeks to identify those core necessary 
features of a thing, attribute, or event by which other regular 
necessary features can be explained. The present book is devoted to 
what Plato and Aristotle have to say about this sort of account, one 
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that identifies what came to be known as the ‘formal cause’. Ferejohn 
mostly steers clear of questions concerning the ontological status of 
that cause, instead focusing on epistemological questions. How can 
one come to be in possession of such an account? What must such an 
account include? How is it to be formulated linguistically, and what role 
do such formulations play within the context of an explanatory 
account? He begins with an account of the centrality of the ‘what is it?’ 
question to the Socratic elenchus. Special attention is paid to the 
Meno’s proposal that epistēmē of a fact rests on an account that works 
through the reason why that fact is the case (97d-98b), and the 
Euthyphro’s assertion that the sort of account that expresses what a 
virtue is will be that which identifies the cause of that virtue, its eidos 
(6d). Ferejohn then proceeds to Aristotle’s development of that idea in 
the Posterior Analytics, according to which a definition expressing the 
‘what is it’ of a regular and necessary feature of the world will play a 
crucial role in a demonstration, the sort of account by which that 
feature’s cause is identified. Ferejohn traces developments in 
Aristotle’s thought: while Aristotle began by emphasizing the role that 
definitions play in identifying the formal cause, he comes to believe 
that those definitions that express efficient causes play a more crucial 
role in scientific and metaphysical explanation. Ferejohn takes this 
shift to have its source in tensions already present within the account 
of scientific explanation offered in the Posterior Analytics. 
 
Although I am not convinced by the main lines of the story 
Ferejohn tells, he asks new, important questions, and opens up new 
lines of interpretation well worth careful consideration. 
 
Ferejohn takes as his starting point Aristotle’s recognition of 
Socrates as the first to explicitly identify definition as a starting point 
of deduction (Meta. i6.987b1-3). Socrates evaluates knowledge claims 
on the basis of the presence or absence of certain conditions for 
knowledge; he thus qualifies as what Ferejohn calls a ‘grade 1 
epistemologist’. Socrates never offers what he takes to be an adequate 
definition of knowledge (by which his account would be an instance of 
what Ferejohn refers to as ‘grade 2 epistemology’), let alone an 
evaluation of competing definitions of knowledge (‘grade 3 
epistemology’). The Socratic realization of the centrality of the account 
of the ‘what is it’ emerged from the commonsense insight that one 
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should know what one is talking about, and developed into the more 
precise position that, without knowing what F-ness is, one is unable to 
determine the second order properties of F or identify the instances of 
F. For example, without knowing what piety is, one knows neither 
whether piety is godbeloved, nor which actions or people are pious. A 
problem arises, famously raised by Geach: how can one proceed 
towards a definition of F, without knowledge that at least some 
particulars are F? Ferejohn persuasively argues that the apparent 
circle can be avoided. Socrates’ assertion at 71b that if one does not 
know the ti esti one cannot know what sort of thing (hopoion) it is 
means not that no F can be recognized as such without a definition of 
F, but without such a definition, one is not in a position to evaluate the 
claims of anything to be an F.  
 
Ferejohn points to Euthyphro 6e as evidence that, for Socrates, 
that adequate definition of a virtue is not only necessary, but is also 
sufficient for recognizing its instances. Euthyphro 10a-11b extends the 
explanatory scope of definitions to second order properties (such as 
being beloved by the gods). We begin to see ‘grade 2 epistemology’ in 
the Meno: knowledge (epistēmē) is said to require an explanatory 
account as it needs to be tied down by a logismos of a reason why 
(97d-98b). Definitions, as understood in the Euthyphro (as well as 
Meno 72c), will make such explanatory accounts possible.  
 
Ferejohn raises an interesting puzzle. Socrates’ refutation of 
actual attempts to define virtues show the inevitable failure of defining 
them by appeal to the sorts of behaviors characteristic of the virtuous; 
there are so many exceptions and possible cases that any such 
definition would take the form of a long disjunction lacking the 
requisite unity. Ferejohn argues that this undercuts the diagnostic 
function of definitions. For if a virtue is not definable in terms of one’s 
behavior, it is to be defined by appeal to the state of soul, which is not 
subject to inspection (41-49). To this it can, perhaps, be countered 
that Socrates’ prime concern is seeing whether there is virtue within 
oneself, not within another. Even if virtue were a purely psychological 
state, it might be thought to be visible through some kind of 
introspection. 
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The third chapter is devoted to the structure of Aristotle’s theory 
of explanation as initially presented in Posterior Analytics i. It is 
perhaps the clearest and most philosophically astute account that this 
theory has received. For Ferejohn, the key to understanding book 1 is 
to see it as Aristotle’s attempt to work out with sufficient precision and 
detail the main lines of the Socratic account of epistēmē. Plato had 
said that epistēmē requires tying down one’s belief with an 
explanatory account, one that works through the reason why the belief 
is true. This is a matter of showing how the belief in question follows 
logically from certain beliefs that do not themselves demand such a 
logos. For both, the truths that ground such explanation are (at least 
in large part) derived from definitions, which express the ‘what is it’ of 
the subject of the proposition in question. Aristotle follows Plato in 
taking such explanation to serve to show why the belief in question is 
necessary. Ferejohn departs from the standard interpretation of this, 
that the proposition in question expresses a certain kind of universal 
state of affairs, which must be the case. For Ferejohn, what the 
demonstration shows is that the truth is certain (for the one who 
follows the demonstration), that there is no possibility that one is 
wrong in believing that the state of affairs holds. Ferejohn nonetheless 
denies that an Aristotelian science is thereby foundationalist in regard 
to justification; although they are certain, the premises find warrant in 
the coherence of the whole demonstrative scheme with itself and with 
the observed facts. 
 
Ferejohn concludes this chapter by turning to Aristotle’s account 
of the first principles, the foundations of explanation. As the ultimate 
bases of demonstration, first principles must be immediate, not 
inferred on the basis of more basic premises. Rather, they are 
(somehow) given to one prior to demonstration. One of Aristotle’s own 
examples of such an immediate predication is the perceptually 
grounded premise that planets do not twinkle (on the basis of which 
one can prove that the planets are near; APo. i 3.78a30-38). But the 
foundations of explanation must satisfy more than the formal, 
extensional criterion of immediacy; they must be maximally 
intelligible. For this reason they are to be kath’ hauta (‘catholic’, as 
Ferejohn renders it.) Catholic predications must satisfy the intensional 
criterion that there is an analytic relation between terms. It is this that 
allows them to be explanatorily basic and is the ground for the 
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premise’s character as immediate. (To this there is added the 
extensional criterion that the terms be coextensive; this ensures that 
the demonstration is formulated in such a way that the middle term 
reveals the explanatorily relevant feature of the subject term.) In 
appealing to analyticity, Ferejohn seems to be suggesting that the 
intelligibility of a demonstrative conclusion has its ultimate ground in 
use of language, not in the mind’s direct insight into the structure of 
reality. But as Ferejohn recognizes, definitions are established and 
revised on the basis of their being suitable foundations of explanation. 
Accordingly, language itself develops in tandem with the explanatory 
accounts of the sciences. The epistemological foundation of 
intelligibility is the set of analytic truths expressed in a language, only 
when it is suitably reformed and refined. 
 
In APo. ii 11 Aristotle asserts that, although demonstration, as 
he conceives it, constitutes an explanation through the identification of 
any variety of cause, that through the identification of a formal cause 
has pride of place, insofar as definitions, the most important variety of 
scientific principle, express the ‘what is it’ or formal cause. But the 
canonical model of demonstration, which reveals the formal cause, is 
incomplete, for it is unable to account for all of the ultimate premises 
of the demonstration of a kath’ hauto property. For example, the 
demonstration that all triangles have the sum of their interior angles 
equal to two right angles requires a non-definitional premise. 
According to Ferejohn, the rest of APo. ii, and the further refinements 
and adaptations that Aristotle’s theory of demonstration undergoes in 
other, later works indicate that Aristotle recognized that the theory of 
demonstration as developed in APo. i is too restrictive. The rest of the 
book is devoted to working through developments in Aristotle’s 
account of demonstration. 
 
The first non-canonical form of demonstration is that whereby a 
demonstrated conclusion is applied to a subgroup of the subject. One 
can, for example, easily explain why all isosceles triangles have the 
sum of their interior angles equal to two right angles, if it has been 
demonstrated that all triangles have this characteristic. While this 
would not meet the standards of a canonical demonstration, as the 
middle term triangle does not convert with isosceles, the whole 
deduction does render the conclusion intelligible, and Ferejohn rightly 
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points out that there is no reason to doubt that Aristotle seems willing 
to call it a ‘demonstration’ in a loose sense and to grant such 
inferences a role in the sciences.  
 
More controversial and philosophically interesting is Ferejohn’s 
take on the non-canonical demonstration discussed in ii 8, a variety of 
deduction by which a definition can (in a sense) be demonstrated. As 
Ferejohn understands it, the demonstration that makes clear the 
definition of a (lunar) eclipse shows how a certain occasional variety of 
blocking of light is regularly predicated of the moon; that which makes 
clear the definition of thunder shows how a certain regular 
representative sound is often predicated of clouds. The crucial middle 
term here is not going to be derived from the essence of the subject, 
as it is in a canonical demonstration. Instead of expressing a formal 
cause, the crucial middle term in these cases expresses an efficient 
cause. Ferejohn interprets Aristotle’s assertion that this sort of 
demonstration is possible when the definiendum ‘has some other 
cause’ (APo. ii 8.93a7, ii 9.93b21-8) as drawing a contrast between 
the canonical case, in which the middle term is the same as the 
subject (insofar as it is definitional of it, and hence is part of its 
essence) and that in which the middle term expresses an efficient 
cause (which is temporally prior to effects, and is accordingly 
something different from it). It is this new understanding of 
demonstration that Ferejohn takes to be at work in Aristotle’s later 
philosophy of science, in which, on his view, efficient causation comes 
to supplant formal causation in both metaphysics and the physical 
sciences. 
 
This interpretation is questionable. Had Aristotle wished to 
distinguish these sorts of demonstrations as those involving the 
efficient cause, he would have said as much; APo. ii 11.94a22 shows 
that Aristotle was already clear on the notion of the efficient cause. 
Instead, he uses the phrase ‘what has some other cause’. The phrase 
is unusual, but it is not the only time it is used. At Meta. v 
18.1022a32-35, Aristotle writes that the phrase kath’ hauto is used to 
refer to a certain kind of entity, that which does not have a cause 
different from itself. His example is ‘human being’: the elements in the 
essence of human being are in some sense the cause of a human 
being, but insofar as these all express (in an indeterminate way) what 
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a human being is, they are not causes other than human beings. The 
implication is that any basic subject, with an essence, is that which has 
no other cause. It would follow that any characteristic that is not a 
basic subject, including properties like having the interior angles equal 
to two right angles, would be that which has a cause other than itself. 
That this is not a late, anomalous notion is confirmed by a passage in 
the Posterior Analytics, in which Aristotle is distinguishing the senses 
of the same term under consideration in Meta. v 18: kath’ hauto. 
Aristotle says that one sense of kath’ hauto is in reference not to 
predications but to things: ‘that which is not said of some other 
subject, as, for example, that which is walking is something different, 
walking, and white…, but substance, and everything that signifies a 
this, is precisely what it is, not being something different’ (APo. i 
4.73b5-8). Here the basic subject is what it is kata itself; predicates 
like walking or white exist only kata something else. If kata here has 
its sense of signifying the cause (Meta. v 18.1022a19-22) as is likely, 
Aristotle is referring to the same distinction in ii 8 and 9. 
 
I suggest that what has a cause other than itself, the sort of 
entity subject to a demonstration of a definition, is a nonsubstantial 
demonstrated predicate, what Aristotle elsewhere calls a kath’ hauto 
sumbebēkos. This will include both geometrical properties, such as 
having the interior angles equal to two right angles, and the 
characteristics of being subject to certain frequent or regularly 
occurring predicates, like those discussed in APo. ii 8. I have 
elsewhere (Explaining an Eclipse: Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics 2.1-10, 
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996) worked out how such 
demonstrations can be integrated within the demonstrative theory of 
APo. i. Ferejohn leaves as a puzzle how the geometrical demonstration 
that triangles have two right angles as the sum of their angles fits 
within Aristotle’s theory. Insofar as he understands Aristotle to hold 
that the sort of demonstration discussed in APo. ii 8 requires filling in 
immediate predications (which at 93b13-14 Aristotle calls ‘remaining 
reasons’) he expresses puzzlement that Aristotle does not make a 
similar point concerning the demonstration that triangles have the sum 
of their angles equal to two right angles (143n35); the puzzle 
disappears if the two varieties of demonstration are the same. 
Likewise, he is puzzled by Aristotle’s apparent assertion that the sort 
of demonstration under discussion will reveal the definition of a 
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musical concord (147n38): the relevant cause seems to be the formal 
cause of mathematical relationships, not the efficient cause of plucking 
of the strings. But we can take all of these demonstrations to be of a 
single kind. The demonstrated predicate is either predicated of a 
complex (a concatenation of simple subjects) or results from the state 
in which the efficient cause is in the appropriate relation to the 
subject. This eliminates the puzzles, and does not involve reading into 
the text distinctions not explicitly made. Further, Ferejohn’s 
interpretation does not permit an integrated reading of Aristotle’s 
atypically full accounts of demonstration in APo. ii 16 and 17, which 
present two ways in which Aristotle sketches an explanatory 
demonstration explaining why broad-leafed plants shed their leaves. 
On one account, the demonstration has as a middle term the essence 
of broad-leafed plants. On the other, the demonstration has as its 
middle term the coagulation of the sap at the joint of the leaves, which 
Ferejohn takes to be the identification of the efficient cause. Ferejohn 
thinks that Aristotle never manages to integrate the two schemes. But, 
if it can be shown that broad-leafed plants are the sort of subject that 
is regularly subject to said coagulation, the integration would be 
straightforward enough. So understood, the full demonstration rests 
on the identification of a formal cause, not an efficient cause, except 
indirectly. The causal model does not threaten the canonical model, as 
Ferejohn says it does; it is rather a special application of it. 
 
Ferejohn makes great hay of the new model of demonstration, 
as he understands it. While the canonical model of demonstration is 
based on a Platonic point of view, according to which making sense of 
the world is a matter of revealing stable relations among essences, 
demonstration as later conceived by Aristotle is suited towards a more 
dynamic account of reality. Physical explanations appeal to nature, 
which is a cluster of capacities, not an essence or form. How then do 
we interpret Aristotle’s assertion that nature is first and foremost form 
(Phys. ii 1.193b7-12)? Is form here primarily an efficient cause, not a 
formal cause? 
 
Ferejohn concludes the book with a brief foray into the waters of 
Metaphysics vii. Aristotle’s task is to understand substances by asking 
the ‘what is it’ question of substance itself. Book 7 on his account 
mirrors the story line he discerns in the development of Aristotle’s 
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account of explanation. Metaphysics vii 1-4 seek the cause of 
substance in substantial essence, which is the same as substance. 
Such a strategy is unable to account for those features of a substance 
that emerge in time through the actualization of the potentialities 
inherent in matter. However, the introduction of matter in an account 
of what substance is threatens the unity of substance, as it is now 
understood as form plus matter. What Ferejohn takes to be Aristotle’s 
definitive account of substance is presented in the fresh start of vii 17. 
The cause of substance responsible for its unity is form considered as 
the efficient cause of the coming to be of the composite. The question 
of the logical unity of substance is transformed into a question of 
natural science: how exactly is it that a formal element shapes and 
directs matter to allow it to become a substance of a certain kind? 
 
The story line of book 7 that Ferejohn presents is somewhat 
schematic, as the scope of his book does not permit the sort of close 
analysis that dominates most treatments of book 7. Nonetheless, the 
general account he gives is plausible, and has the benefit of being 
supported by a new and creative account of the structure of the sorts 
of demonstrations to which Aristotle appeals in vii 17. It stands even 
without the support of the new interpretation of the role of efficient 
causation in the demonstrative theory of the Posterior Analytics. 
 
Ferejohn has devoted much of his career to shedding much 
needed light on Aristotle’s epistemology and philosophy of science; 
Formal Causes continues the project. The first part, which takes 
Aristotle’s thought on these matters to be a direct and self-conscious 
furthering of Socratic methodology, can be recommended without 
reservation. Its account of the fundamental strategy and purpose of 
the Posterior Analytics is among the best introductions to this work. I 
find much of the second part unconvincing, but the history of the 
interpretation of APo. ii 8-10 shows that it is very unlikely that any line 
of interpretation of these important and difficult chapters will ever 
meet universal approval. Ferejohn successfully leads us to ask new 
questions and the interpretative strategies he works through will 
surely be included among the main options. 
